
Avant-Garde and Everyday

Everyday life has until now resisted the historical.

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That Heidegger was a National Socialist is well known. That there is a connection between this political commitment and his philosophical thought is increasingly acknowledged. What the precise character of this connection is, however, remains highly contested. Much of the dispute is internal to the interpretation of Heidegger's philosophical writings: the meaning of 'resoluteness' in *Being and Time*, for example, or the dating and significance of the 'turn' in his thought, away from the existential analytic of *Dasein* toward an epochal account of the history of Being dominated by the relationship between metaphysics and technology. The complexity of the textual issues here is often daunting. However, there is also a broader context from which these matters ultimately cannot be disengaged, involving debates about fascism itself. For as an object of reflection and inquiry, 'fascism' is notoriously resistant to conventional forms of political and ideological analysis. Herein, in part, lies its significance: fascism problematizes 'the political', while presenting itself as its truth.¹ As such, it opens itself up to philosophical forms of interpretation and analysis which, while based on its history as a political movement, nonetheless of necessity exceed its bounds. From this perspective, fascism is no *merely* political form – one among a series of alternatives to be listed in the catalogues of comparative politics as competing forms of organization or rule – but a manifestation of deep-rooted historical, or even metaphysical, tendencies or possibilities of the age.

This was certainly how both Benjamin and Heidegger conceived it in the 1930s. For Benjamin, fascism was an 'aestheticization of politics', a political management of aesthetics which exploited the technological and cultural potential of modernity for reactionary and

destructive ends. As such, it is a permanent possibility inherent in the social forms of modernity itself.² For Heidegger, on the other hand, for a time at least, National Socialism was the political representative of a force for national renewal which corresponded to the deepest practical impulses of his own thought.³ Later, in a displacement of his disappointment with it onto its ideologues, it would be judged to have betrayed its 'inner truth and greatness' by misunderstanding its historical task.⁴ In the end, it came to be seen as an exemplary expression of the very forces to which Heidegger had initially hoped it was the antidote.

I shall not pursue Heidegger's belated interpretation of National Socialism as a manifestation of planetary technology here, although I am considerably less impressed by it than some.⁵ Nor shall I consider Benjamin's futurist-inspired analysis of fascism as a political manipulation of the need for expression. Rather, I shall take the notion of aestheticization more literally as the cue for an inquiry into the politics of Heidegger's analysis of temporality in *Being and Time*: the politics of what is effectively an *aestheticization of ontology* or ontologization of transcendental aesthetics.⁶

Any appeal to the notion of fascism in a philosophical analysis of temporality is fraught with dangers. Name-calling, political reductionism, guilt by association – all threaten to trivialize, travesty or otherwise compromise the seriousness of the inquiry. In this case, there is also the danger of anachronism, since the publication of *Being and Time* predates Heidegger's apparently sudden conversion to the cause of National Socialism in the spring of 1933 by a full six years.⁷ Yet there can be no doubt that the politics of nations is at stake in the analysis of 'co-historizing' as 'destiny' in *Being and Time*; or that, as Wolin puts it, following Löwith, 'Heidegger intended his political involvements of the 1930s as *the existentielle consummation of the categorial framework of his 1927 book*; more specifically, . . . the philosopher viewed his entry into the Nazi party as a concrete historical manifestation of authentic resolute existence.'⁸

Being and Time is remarkable for its attempt to derive its account of authentic existence directly from its analysis of time. However, this does not make it a 'fascist' text or Heidegger's existentialism a fascistic philosophy. The 'consistency' which Löwith notes between Heidegger's political involvement and the 'fundamental thesis' of *Being and Time*⁹ is too weak a basis upon which to build a political reading of that text. In fact, it encourages a biographical one, insofar as it makes Heidegger's political commitment an exemplary instance of an existential choice. After all, why should Heidegger have chosen

fascism as opposed to, for example, Communism? (The conversion of Lukács to Communism in the aftermath of the First World War, in the context of a similarly Kierkegaardian philosophical background, springs to mind as an alternative instance of such a choice.) A conceptual connection between the argument of *Being and Time* and the *content* of Heidegger's political choice must be established, if the book is to submit to a properly political reading. Here both the specificity of Heidegger's understanding of fascism (his 'private National Socialism'¹⁰) and the prematurity of *Being and Time* in relation to his political choice must be taken into account. For each suggests that the key to Heidegger's politics is to be found not in the concept of fascism as such, but in a specification of the broader yet related notion of conservative revolution.

Conservative revolution: fascism as reactionary modernism

'Conservative revolution' is a phrase coined by Hugo von Hofmannsthal in 1927 to refer to the politics of radical reaction which prospered in Germany in the period immediately after the First World War. It marks a distinctive adaptation of the Romantic tradition of counter-revolution against the Enlightenment to the changed circumstances of the twentieth century. The distinguishing feature of this politics was its combination of an aggressive rejection of social, cultural and political modernity with an *embrace of technology*, which it detached from the semantic context of 'civilization' and symbolically recoded in terms of an irrationalist and nationalistic conception of 'culture' (*Kultur*). Pioneers of the search for a 'third way' between capitalism and Communism, conservative revolutionaries such as Spengler and Jünger (both of whom Heidegger referred to frequently in his early Freiburg lectures) are generally held to have laid the intellectual foundations for the success of National Socialism. As the first organization fully to exploit modern technology for political ends, the Nazis directly appropriated many of their themes. However, ideologically, German fascism is nonetheless a distinct form, insofar as it developed its own racial mythology. How central such mythologies are to the concept of fascism in general – as opposed to its specific German variant, Hitlerism – is one of the issues at stake in the debate over Heidegger's politics. Few of either Hitler's allies or opponents in the early 1930s envisaged the extent to which his personal ideology would become a decisive political fact in the development of the Nazi regime.¹¹

Heidegger no more shared the conservative revolutionaries' unrestrained enthusiasm for technology than he did the Nazis' biogistic racial version of nationalism; although he did believe that the Germans had a special mission to combine *Technik* and *Kultur*.¹² What he did share with both of them, however, was a diagnosis of the world-historical situation as one of crisis and decline, a nationalist definition of its political shape (conservative revolution as *national* revolution), and a hope for the future grounded in a quite particular revolutionary temporality of renewal. Like the conservative revolutionaries' affirmative but mystical relation to technology, this sense of crisis had its origins in the First World War and its immediate aftermath in the turbulence of the Weimar Republic. It came to a head in the trauma of the Great Slump (1929–32), which provided the Nazis with their opportunity for power. For the German Right as a whole, the postwar years were fundamentally defined by the experience of war, as the 'afterwar' (*Nachkriege*). This experience was, first, that of the extraordinary (destructive) power of modern technology; and second, one of extreme national humiliation and loss. Out of this dual experience sprang a mystical theory of war (exemplified by the writings of Ernst Jünger) which was simultaneously *nationalistic*, *technological* and *cultic*. Germany was to be reborn through a new symbolic dimension, manifest most fully in war, in which 'the natural reaches through the plaster layers of the modern cities and fills the operation of machines and cleaned-up marionettes with a deeper life, one superior to the purposeful life and whose essence cannot be grasped with mathematics.'¹³

Heidegger's appropriation of aspects of Jünger's thought is well known.¹⁴ However, it is less the mystical-technological aspect of what Herf has dubbed 'reactionary modernism' with which I am concerned – although it undoubtedly helps to explain Heidegger's mistake about the Nazis' relation to technology – than the paradoxical temporality of the ideas of conservative revolution and reactionary modernism themselves. For like all fundamental political categories of modernity (such as crisis, to which it was a response), conservative revolution is an essentially temporal notion. It is also, of course, a central term in Habermas's critique of Benjamin's thought.¹⁵ We can interpret Herf's notion of reactionary modernism in strictly temporal terms. The problem with Herf's own more restricted definition (the conjunction of a backward-looking politics with an affirmation of technology) is that its modernism is identified with technology, rather than with the temporal structure of the combination itself. The latter consequently appears as the paradoxical product of a mere aggregate of

contradictory tendencies, rather than a novel, complex, but *integral* form of modernism in its own right.

This leads Wolin, for example, to conflate the ideology of conservative revolution with 'the entrenched *antimodernism* of the German mandarin intelligentsia'.¹⁶ On the other hand, Herf opposes Heidegger's position to reactionary modernism, on the grounds of his views about technology, despite their common temporal structure.¹⁷ Yet, as a counter-revolutionary ideology, conservative revolution is modernist in the full temporal sense (outlined in chapter 1) of affirming the temporality of the new. Its image of the future may derive from the mythology of some lost origin or suppressed national essence, but its temporal dynamic is rigorously futural. In this respect, it is the term 'conservative' which is the misnomer, rather than 'revolution'. Conservative revolution is a form of revolutionary *reaction*. It understands that what it would 'conserve' is already lost (if indeed it ever existed, which is doubtful), and hence must be created anew. It recognizes that under such circumstances the chance presents itself fully to realize this 'past' *for the first time*. The fact that the past in question is primarily imaginary is thus no impediment to its political force, but rather its very condition (myth). Hence the conduciveness of Herf's label to a strictly temporal reading, despite his own more restricted definition.

What Herf calls reactionary modernism is not a hybrid form (modernism + reaction). Rather, it draws our attention to the modernistic temporality of reaction *per se*, once the destruction of traditional forms of social authority has gone beyond a certain point. This point appears to have been reached in the leading European societies around the time of the First World War; hence the tremendous contemporary upsurge of revolutionary ideologies of both 'reactionary' and 'progressive' types. Moreover, this should not be conceived as a merely transitional phenomenon – in the way, for example, that a certain historical revisionism would now see the whole period from 1914–45 as *merely* a transitional, if exceptionally troubled, phase between stages of capitalist development. For both may be regarded as temporally integral political forms of capitalist societies, alternative political articulations of the revolutionary temporality of the social form of capital accumulation itself: that 'constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation', which Marx and Engels identified as the distinguishing feature of the present epoch nearly one hundred and fifty years ago.¹⁸

Marx and Engels's error was to see in this process an ultimately

linear tendency towards the elimination of every social bond 'other than naked self-interest . . . callous "cash payment": a drowning of 'the heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy waters of egotistical calculation'.¹⁹ To the contrary, it has turned out to involve, not their elimination, but their *transformation* and *contradictory reintegration* into the fabric of social relations in capitalist societies. As Balibar has argued, the history of capitalist societies is best viewed as 'a history of the *reactions* of the complex of "non-economic" social relations, which are the binding agent of a historical collectivity of individuals, to the de-structuring with which the expansion of the value form threatens them.'²⁰ This applies as much to those Marx cites (religion, occupational status, family, nation, age and sex) as to those he omits (race, ethnicity). Indeed, one might go so far as to say that it is the contested articulation of these relations with those of the production and circulation of capital which constitutes the political process in capitalist societies. The historical articulation of temporal form is one of the main things at stake in such struggles.²¹

There are at least three 'revolutionary' temporalities at play, quite apart from the various rearticulations of temporalities of tradition: the hegemonic temporality of the self-revolutionizing process of capitalist production; the revolutionary temporality of the oppositional practice of social transformation in the name of a new, post-capitalist (traditionally, socialist) economic form; and the counter-revolutionary temporality of a variety of reactionary modernisms. Both the second and third of these present themselves at the cultural level as avant-garde (by virtue of their explicit political identifications with radically new futures); while the first could be said to correspond, culturally, to modernism in its regulated, post-World War Two sense as 'the tradition of the new'.²²

The hypothesis guiding what follows is that Heidegger did not become a National Socialist because of what we now identify as the distinctive ideological traits of Nazism (anti-Semitism and biologicistic racism – Heidegger always rejected the latter), but because the Nazis appeared to him as the authentic representatives of conservative revolution in Germany. From the standpoint of the temporal structure of its project, fascism is a particularly radical form of conservative revolution. National Socialism was a reactionary avant-garde. It is here that its pertinence to the understanding of modernity as a temporalization of history lies (along with the pertinence of a political reading of Heidegger's philosophy): in the temporality of what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have called the 'Nazi myth'.²³

On this analysis, a myth is a narrative symbolizing a distant origin which posits the present as the site of its 'total self-fulfilment'. National Socialism was based upon a mythical construction of the German people (*Volk*) as an organic, racial-spiritual whole. In instituting a struggle over the 'means of identification' in the name of this myth, it posited the realization within and against the present of the truth of its originary meaning. However, this meaning, represented by the Nazis as inherent in the biological constitution of the German people as the 'soul' of the race (essentially, its 'culture-bearing' ability to found civilizations), was actually, of course, an extremely recent invention. Indeed, as Hobsbawm points out, 'the race destined through Hitler to dominate the world did not even have a name until 1898 when an anthropologist coined the term "Nordic".²⁴ Its very existence, historically, was contingent upon the speculations of the new science of genetics; while its future (the realization of the myth) depended on the application of the new 'knowledge' as eugenics. As such, the Nazis' 'German people' was less the symbolic reflection of any kind of historical continuity, of culture or descent, than the expression of the will to power of a purely constructive present, the nationalism of a pure modernity – that *will to will* which Heidegger would later identify (in his 1940 essay on Nietzsche's metaphysics) as part of the essence of nihilism.²⁵

Thus, contrary to received opinion, although fascism may involve the social mobilization of residual or even archaic forces resistant to modernity – the attempt 'to make the rebellion of suppressed nature against domination directly useful to domination'²⁶ – it should not thereby itself be judged archaic or even 'noncontemporaneous'²⁷ as a political form. Rather, like the rise of various neo-nationalisms, religious 'fundamentalisms' and racisms today,²⁸ it is neither a relic nor an archaism, but a form of *political modernism*; just as Heidegger's existentialism is a form of *philosophical modernism*. What the two have in common is a quite particular (reactionary) articulation or inflection of the temporality of modernity. Fascism is a reactionary political modernism; Heidegger's existentialism is a reactionary philosophical modernism – in the literal sense of 'reaction' as a movement towards the reversal of an existing tendency or state of affairs. Italian futurism, the poetry of Eliot and Pound, and the novels of Wyndham Lewis have long been recognized as examples of politically reactionary artistic modernisms;²⁹ although some have found the conjunction hard to swallow. What I am suggesting is that the temporal structure of such phenomena contains the key to a broader understanding of the politics of reaction more generally.

Furthermore, just as we may read historicism as a 'bad' modernity (in Hegel's sense of the bad infinity),³⁰ so reactionary modernism may be understood as a bad modernism; not (or not primarily) in a moral or political sense, but in terms of the contradiction internal to its temporal structure. This structure – the structure of radical reaction within and against modernity – is of necessity contradictory, since one of the things it aims to reverse is the production of the very temporality to which it is itself subject. Radical reaction cannot but reproduce, and thereby performatively affirm, the temporal form of the very thing against which it is pitted (modernity). Hence the necessity for it to misrepresent its temporal structure to itself as some kind of 'recovery' or 'return'. As we shall see, this is also one of the effects of Heidegger's discourse on 'Being', as it is of the historical dimension of most religious discourses.³¹

National Socialism radicalized the nationalist dimension of conservative revolution both ideologically and organizationally: ideologically, by turning it into an 'anti-Jewish revolution';³² organizationally, by providing it with a new kind of political party at the head of a mass movement. (The ideologues of conservative revolution, in the restricted historical sense in which it predates National Socialism, had retained a certain attachment to traditional political élites.)³³ In the process, the Nazis also radicalized the mythic dimension of its temporal structure. It was *this* radicalization with which Heidegger identified in the fantasy of his 'private National Socialism', despite his rejection of the Nazis' biologicistic racial coding of the myth, in favour of a more abstruse philosophical version deriving from eighteenth-century Hellenism.³⁴ Heidegger's politics in the 1930s were those of a 'heroico-tragic' national-revolutionism of the Right,³⁵ for which his philosophy provided both the inspiration and the interpretive frame. All that was needed for their union was for the Nazis to recognize this philosophy as the truth of their project and Heidegger himself as their spiritual-intellectual leader. Heidegger appears to have clung onto this hope, despite its relatively swift disappointment by the Nazi establishment, for some considerable time.³⁶ The roots of this kind of identification and aspiration in the thematics and political history of nineteenth-century German philosophy have been expounded elsewhere.³⁷ Here it is the philosophical specificity of Heidegger's fantasy, rather than its discursive conditions, which is at issue.

What is the relationship between the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of *Dasein*, as lived in the moment of vision and resolute decision (outlined in *Being and Time*), and the temporal structure of conservative

revolution as a reactionary political modernism? How is each related to the ecstatic dimension of the totality which structures Benjamin's conception of historical experience? And what, if any, are the political implications of our extension of Heidegger's argument about death to history? These are the questions which must be addressed if Benjamin's conception of historical time is to be uprooted from its original context and put to work critically in the present, in the way that was suggested at the end of the previous chapter.

Vision and decision: existence as repetition (against decisionism)

Being and Time is remarkable for its attempt to derive an account of authentic existence directly from its analysis of time as temporalization. The main stages of this argument concern: (1) the origin of temporality in the anticipation of death and the determination of existence as finite transcendence; (2) the exposition of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*: literally, ownness or propriety) as the 'existentiell' appropriation (*Aneignung*: literally, making one's own) by *Dasein* of its existential structure; (3) the elaboration of such appropriation as anticipatory resoluteness in the face of death, or the choice of fate; and (4) the characterization of this choice in terms of the idea of destiny as the 'historizing' of a people (*Volk*). Stage one is the founding philosophical gesture and unique achievement of Heidegger's existentialism. Stage two adopts and existentially reworks the structure of reflection constitutive of the metaphysical definition of the subject, to provide *Dasein* with an immanent factual ideal.³⁸ At the third stage, this ontological structure of possible propriety acquires a more definite (ontical) orientation, via the categories of *situation* and *heritage* (*Erbschaft*). Finally, the account is completed by the addition of a social dimension, giving its complex practical structure a determinate political meaning. Only at this fourth stage does it become possible for Heidegger to think history as the product of the 'co-historizing' of *Dasein* or 'historizing of peoples'. The authentic temporality of anticipatory resoluteness appears here as 'authentic historicity': the repetition (*Wiederholung*) of a heritage of possibilities, through a process of 'communication and struggle' in which, it is said, 'the power of destiny becomes free.'³⁹

Such repetition is described by Heidegger as occurring in a 'moment of vision' (*Augenblick*: literally, a glance of an eye) which 'deprives the "today" of its character as present'. In the temporal

difference constitutive of repetition in the moment of vision, history appears as 'the "recurrence" of the possible'. This is contrasted with a situation in which 'one's existence . . . is loaded down with the legacy of a 'past' which has become unrecognisable, and . . . seeks the modern (*das Moderne*).'⁴⁰ Heidegger is thus explicitly opposed to the interpretation of his work in terms of the category of the modern. Yet in the concrete futurity of vision and decision, and the underlying existential priority of possibility over actuality, that is precisely what it is revealed to be. The difficulty consists less in understanding Heidegger as a distinctively 'modern' thinker than in comprehending the way in which he turns the temporality of modernity against itself, by combining a sense of futurity as the essence of existence (finite transcendence) with the idea of destiny, to produce a radically reactionary point of view. The key lies in the novelty of his conception of repetition. For it is here, it will be argued, rather than in any kind of 'decisionism', that the politics of Heidegger's temporalization of history is to be found.

To see how this works, we need to attend to what we might call the 'double coding' of *Being and Time*, whereby its strictly existential or deconstructive aspect is underwritten by a prior and unstated conception of history, associated with a correspondingly unexamined set of sociological assumptions. These unexamined assumptions are the source of the interpretive determinacy which gives the book its phenomenological force or living meaning. This double coding is marked within the text itself in the definition of *Dasein* as a being which is 'ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological': a being whose understanding of Being is a 'definite characteristic' of its own being.⁴¹ However, as we shall see, this ontical-ontological factor plays a far greater role in the book than that which is formally prescribed for it. There is an *overdetermination of the ontological by the ontical* in *Being and Time* which structures the book as a whole. In this respect, it is quite impossible to 'extract ourselves from all gestures of valorisation and from their prejudices or presuppositions' – as Nancy, for example, hopes⁴² – in order to be true to the purely deconstructive, or more strictly existential, side of Heidegger's argument. Or, at any rate, it is impossible to do this without liquidating the book's practical side, by accepting 'the impossibility of a practical philosophy drawn from the "thought of being"' of *whatever* kind – a position to which the deconstructive strategy (derived from Heidegger's later writings) appears inevitably to lead.⁴³ To do this, however, is to obliterate the site of greatest interest in Heidegger's early work: the relationship of time to politics. On the other hand,

one must acknowledge that it is the (failed) attempt to read *Being and Time* purely deconstructively, in defensive response to the debates over Heidegger's politics, which has brought its dual structure most clearly to the fore.⁴⁴ In the process, it has also served to highlight the inadequacies of the prevailing 'left' interpretation of the politics of *Being and Time* in terms of the idea of decisionism.

It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that Heidegger's existentialism is a philosophy of freedom which lacks a concept of action, and deliberately so. Its fundamental impulse is practical (the search for a 'proper' or 'authentic' existence), yet its theoretical terms subvert the very idea of practice as traditionally construed, as an object of deductions from principles. In the order of systematic philosophy since Aristotle, ethics and politics follow from metaphysics as first philosophy. Yet it is precisely this conception of philosophy as metaphysics ('the traditional content of ancient ontology') which Heidegger sets out in *Being and Time* to 'destroy'.⁴⁵ We must thus seek the practical meaning of the book elsewhere, in the terms of this destruction itself.

This is, in fact, the first move in the decisionist reading. It acknowledges the undermining of the traditional conception of action by the existential understanding of the self, and the replacement of the notion of the will by the existential determination of 'resoluteness'. However, in rejecting all normative principles which might function as regulative measures of resoluteness (as constraints on *Dasein's* essential existential openness), *Being and Time* is taken to open up a theoretical vacuum around action – '[i]n the moment of vision nothing can occur'⁴⁶ – into which a positive but arbitrary notion of the will inevitably flows, as the actual determinant of resolute existence. Existentialism is thus understood politically to lead to decisionism, despite the contradiction between the (subjectivistic) philosophical terms of this notion of the will and Heidegger's concept of existence. An 'energetic but empty' sense of possibility collapses into the positivism of an identification with authority.⁴⁷ This regression is marked within Heidegger's text in the 'secular mystical fatalism' according to which individual decisions are only authentic if they repeat the 'destiny of the people' to which *Dasein* belongs. Destiny is thus interpreted here as an authoritarian political category through which individualistic and organic-collectivist perspectives are fused, to produce a situation in which subordination to a *völkisch* authority masquerades as radical freedom. Authentic existence is a constantly reiterated leap into communal identification, wherein the content of action is externally determined by the authority best able to promote

itself, at any particular moment, as the embodiment of the destiny of the people. At best, 'the logic of *Being and Time* oscillates indecisively pro and contra the heritage of philosophical subjectivism'; at worst, it is '*nakedly opportunistic*'.⁴⁸

This reading fits well with the subsequent development of Heidegger's thought, insofar as the latter was motivated by the attempt to eliminate the remnants of metaphysical subjectivism implicit in earlier formulations. In fact, it is arguable that Heidegger's political involvement during the period of his rectorship functioned experimentally, as a test of the activist side of his thought. The acknowledged 'failure' of the rectorship (Heidegger's own description) may then be seen to register the failure of *Being and Time* itself, leading Heidegger to rethink its terms.⁴⁹ This is borne out by the lectures on Nietzsche (1936-40), albeit with 1938 rather than 1934 appearing as the turning point, theoretically speaking.⁵⁰ The engagement with Nazism appears as the key to the later writings, in which the idea of 'release-ment' or 'letting-be' (*Gelassenheit*), as a 'will not to will', replaces the wilful resoluteness of the decision of existence, as Heidegger retreats from the technologically dominated world of action into a supposedly more deeply historical 'thinking at the end of philosophy' in preparation for a new epoch of Being. With the termination of the attempt to find an existential equivalent to practical reason, world history is reduced to a mere aspect of a self-sufficient, philosophically defined, 'history of Being'.⁵¹

However, there are problems with this approach which go beyond its reduction of the specificity of existential analysis to an unstable combination of previously established positions: 'voluntarism', 'fatalism', 'decisionism', etc.,⁵² beyond the problem of the will, and the question of whether resoluteness does or does not imply 'the deliberate action of a subject', whatever Heidegger may have intended.⁵³ They concern its neglect of the temporal logic of 'authentic historicity', its neglect of repetition. Decisionist interpretations of resoluteness attribute its determinacy in practice to its indeterminacy in theory; an indeterminacy which exalts the pathos of decision, while capitulating to power.⁵⁴ Yet for all the absence of regulative *principles*, Heidegger's resoluteness is far from being as lacking in determinacy as this reading suggests. It is true that it is the situation, and the situation alone, which is always decisive, in the sense of giving concrete factual content to the constantly reiterated 'decision to exist'. But if it is to be authentic, the character of this resolution must nonetheless be shaped by *Dasein's* appropriation of its historicity as repetition.⁵⁵ There is a temporal structure of meaning to Heidegger's concept of resoluteness, ignored