
Notes

Preface

1. Wulf Herzogenrath, 'The Anti-technological Technology of Nam June Paik's Robots', in *Nam June Paik: Video Works 1963-88*, Hayward Gallery, London, 1988, p. 16.

2. See, for example, Stephen W. Melville, *Philosophy Beside Itself: On Deconstruction and Modernism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1986, ch. 2, and Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory*, Verso, London and New York, 1987, ch. 1 – a book which was originally to have been entitled *A Critique of French Philosophical Modernism*.

3. It is recognition of this fact which places Fredric Jameson's work on the subject so far ahead of its competitors, however inconsistent or ultimately contradictory its presentation of postmodernism as a 'cultural logic' may be. For a reflection on some of these contradictions, via a critique of Jameson's appropriation of Adorno, see my 'A Marxism for the Postmodern? Jameson's Adorno', *New German Critique* 56, Spring/Summer 1992.

4. Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*, Verso, London, 1983, p. 33. Habermas's lectures were given in 1983-4 and published in Germany in 1985. They are translated by Frederick Lawrence as Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987.

5. See Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1888), Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1946. Engels's title is more accurately translated as '*Ludwig Feuerbach and the Way Out of (or Exit from) [der Ausgang] Classical German Philosophy*'. The distinction is important, since if the way out is blocked, one must either turn back or remain on the threshold until such time as the way is clear: 'Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.' Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (1966), trans. E.B. Ashton, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, p. 3.

6. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979), trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984, p. xiv.

7. This paradox was avoided by earlier purely semiotic or literary analyses of historiographic form, since they were agnostic about epistemological issues. See, in particular, Roland Barthes, 'Historical Discourse' (1967), in Michael Lane (ed.), *Structuralism: A Reader*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1970 and Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1973. Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* (three volumes, 1983-5, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago University

Press, Chicago, 1984-8; hereafter *TN* 1-3) only partly belongs to this tendency, since it takes the more theoretically ambiguous form of a *dialectical negation* of both philosophy and positive science by poetics; thereby inscribing the conceptual logic of one of its superseded moments into the heart of its result – a dilemma faced by all attempts to go ‘beyond’ Hegel, or philosophy more generally.

8. Charles Baudelaire, ‘My Heart Laid Bare’, CXI, in his *Intimate Journals*, trans. Christopher Isherwood, Black Spring Press, London, 1989, p. 56.

9. For a synoptic overview of the intensification of time-consciousness during a particularly important phase of this process, see Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1983.

10. See Plato, ‘Phaedo’ (67e), in *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953, Volume 1, p. 418, and Sigmund Freud, ‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’ (1915), in *Civilisation, Society, Religion: Group Psychology, Civilisation and its Discontents and Other Works*, trans. James Strachey, Penguin Freud Library, Volume 12, Harmondsworth, 1985, p. 89: ‘We recall the old saying: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. If you want to preserve peace, arm for war. It would be in keeping with the times to alter it: *Si vis vitam, para mortem*. If you want to endure life, prepare yourself for death.’

11. Benjamin to Scholem, 6 May 1934, in *The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940*, ed. by Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 439. See also the earlier letter to Scholem of 17 April 1931, *ibid.*, pp. 376-8.

12. See Raymond Williams, ‘Notes on Marxism in Britain since 1945’, in his *Problems in Materialism and Culture*, Verso, London, 1980, p. 237.

1. Modernity: A Different Time

1. See, for example, the four volumes in the recent Open University series edited by Stuart Hall that go under the general heading of *Understanding Modern Societies: An Introduction*, Polity Press/Open University, Oxford, 1992.

2. For an excellent account of the ‘ahistorical historicism’ of sociology’s reliance on ‘logically ordered contrasts between structural types’, see Philip Abrams, ‘The Sense of the Past and the Origins of Sociology’, *Past and Present* 55, 1972, pp. 18-32. A similar disruption of temporal complacency occurs in anthropology as soon as the social relations of fieldwork become the object of an explicitly political theoretical interest. See Talal Asad, *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, Ithaca Press, London, 1973; Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1983; James Clifford, ‘On Ethnographic Authority’ (1983), in *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1988, pp. 21-54; James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds), *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, California University Press, Berkeley, 1986.

3. Karl Marx, *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy* (1859), Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, pp. 20-1.

4. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Volume 1, (1867) trans. Ben Fowkes, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976, ch. 15.

5. Siegfried Kracauer, *History: The Last Things Before the Last*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1969, p. 38.

6. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method* (1960), trans. Hazel Barnes, Vintage Books, New York, 1968, p. 92. Cf. Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ (1940), in his *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, Fontana, London, 1973, Theses XI-XII, pp. 260-3; Louis Althusser, ‘Marxism is not a Historicism’ (1968), in Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster, Verso, London, 1979, Pt II, ch. 5.

7. See, for example, Scott Lash, *The Sociology of Postmodernism*, Routledge, London and New York, 1990; Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, Routledge, London and New York, 1992.

8. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, p. 1342.

9. See, for example, Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (1986), trans. Mark Ritter, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, 1992.

10. It is ironic, in this respect, that Beck's updating of the classical sociology of modernity should sail under the flag of 'reflexive modernization', since it is the very reflexivity of modernity which undermines the temporality of modernization. Oddly, there is no theoretical discussion of time or temporality in *Risk Society*. See also Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernisation: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994.

11. Marshall Berman, 'Why Modernism Still Matters', in Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman (eds), *Modernity and Identity*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, p. 34.

12. Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air*; Perry Anderson, 'Modernity and Revolution', *New Left Review* 144, March/April 1984, pp. 96-113. See also Berman's reply to Anderson, 'The Signs in the Street: A Response to Perry Anderson', *New Left Review* 144, pp. 114-23. Anderson's essay is reprinted in his *A Zone of Engagement*, Verso, London and New York, 1992, pp. 25-45, with the addition of a Postscript from 1985, pp. 46-55. References below are to the original place of publication.

13. *All That is Solid*, p. 15.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 20; emphasis added.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 88, 16-17.

16. Anderson, 'Modernity and Revolution', p. 113.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

18. In his discussion of the concept of revolution ('Modernity and Revolution', p. 112; 'Postscript', pp. 46-7), Anderson focuses exclusively on its political rather than its social form, despite the occurrence in his description of the modernist conjuncture of 'the imaginative proximity of social revolution' ('Modernity and Revolution', p. 104). An earlier piece, 'The Notion of Bourgeois Revolution' (1976), suffers from a similar restriction of scope, while nonetheless offering some interesting reflections which bear directly on the question of the relationship between the two forms. Perry Anderson, *English Questions*, Verso, London and New York, 1992, pp. 105-18.

19. *All That is Solid*, pp. 16-17. In 'Why Modernism Still Matters', the 'classic age' contracts, to run 'from the 1840s to the aftermath of the First World War' (p. 34); but this is now the age of modernism, not modernity. 'Modernity' more or less drops out of the picture altogether, confirming the culturalism of the earlier analysis.

20. *All That is Solid*, p. 16.

21. The self-fulfilling character of theories of modernism which remain unreflexively bound to the perspective of their objects is a preoccupation of Raymond Williams's late work on modernism. See Williams, *The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists*, ed. Tony Pinkney, Verso, London, 1989, chs 1 and 2. But the problem is equally if not more acute in sociological theories of modernity. 'Modernity' is not just the privileged object of classical sociological theory; the concept constituted its standpoint as an academic discipline at the time of its foundation in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. David Frisby, *Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 2.

22. Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections From Damaged Life* (1951), trans. E.F.N. Jephcott, Verso, London, 1978, p. 218.

23. The term 'postmodern' first appears in the 1930s in discussions of Latin American poetry (*postmodernismo*), but its meaning there lacks its current epochal dimension. An often cited early occurrence of the latter sense is the 1947 edition of Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History*. The word first began to gain a general currency

in American literary theory in the early 1960s, particularly through the work of Leslie Fielder. It was only in the 1970s and early 1980s, however, that it came to acquire the critical prominence which was the basis for its more recent wholesale circulation as a general label for the character of the times. Central to this process of popularization were Charles Jencks, *The Language of Postmodern Architecture*, Academy Editions, London, 1977; Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*; and Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', *New Left Review* 146, July/August 1984, pp. 53-92. For a discussion of the history of the term, see Ihab Hassan, *The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture*, Ohio State University Press, 1987, pp. 84-96. The recent attempt to trump the postmodern with the idea of the 'post-contemporary' (as in the series of 'Post-Contemporary Interventions', edited by Stanley Fish and Fredric Jameson for Duke University Press) looks like another, if more desperate, variant of the same self-defeating temporal logic.

24. Reinhart Koselleck, "Neuzeit": Remarks on the Semantics of the Modern Concept of Movement', in his *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985, pp. 231-66. For other, more wide-ranging surveys of the semantic prehistory of 'modernity', see Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, 1966-76)*, trans. Robert M. Wallace, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1983; Matei Calinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1987, pp. 11-92; Hans Robert Jauss, 'Literarische Tradition und gegenwärtiges Bewusstsein der Modernität', in *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1970; and Jacques Le Goff, 'Antique (Ancient)/Modern', in *Memory and History*, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 21-50. I have drawn liberally from each of these sources in what follows, abstracting from the differential register in which the new temporal logic is to be found in different European languages, which is bound up with the different forms and rates of economic, political and cultural development in European nation-states. However, it is important to distinguish this complexity, internal to European development, from differences in the meaning of the modern in 'non-Western' cultures, produced by their exposure to European ideas and social forms in the context of colonial and post-colonial relations of military and economic domination.

25. Koselleck, *Futures Past*, p. 233.

26. Le Goff, *Memory and History*, p. 27.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

28. Berman, 'Why Modernism Still Matters', p. 33.

29. Koselleck, *Futures Past*, p. 238.

30. Octavio Paz, *Children of the Mire*, trans. Rachel Phillips, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1974, p. 23. For further discussion of the multiplicity of relations between the concepts of modernity and eternity, see ch. 4.

31. Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, p. 116; translation amended.

32. Koselleck, *Futures Past*, pp. 249, 246. See also Blumenberg, 'The Epochs of the Concept of an Epoch', in *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, pp. 457-82.

33. Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften* [GS] I, 3, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt M. 1980, p. 1152; quoted in translation in Frisby, *Fragments of Modernity*, p. 15.

34. Calinescu, *Five Faces*, p. 45.

35. Williams, *The Politics of Modernism*, p. 32.

36. Calinescu, *Five Faces*, p. 92.

37. Williams, *The Politics of Modernism*, p. 32.

38. Lyotard, 'Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?', in *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 79.

39. Baudelaire, 'The Painter of Modern Life' (1863), in Charles Baudelaire, *The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays*, trans. and ed. Jonathan Mayne, de Capo Press, New York, n.d. (reprint of Phaidon Press ed., 1964) pp. 12-13.

40. Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, Pt II, ch. 4.
41. Jules Michelet, *Histoire de France*, Volume II, Paris, 1885, p. 161.
42. For an account of money as the 'first form of appearance of capital' (self-expanding value), see Marx, *Capital*, Volume 1, chs 3–6. The major work of Georg Simmel, the first sociologist of 'modernity', was of course *The Philosophy of Money* (1900), ed. David Frisby, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby, Routledge, London, 1990.
43. Koselleck, *Futures Past*, p. 250.
44. Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977, p. 13.
45. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (1970), trans. C. Lenhardt, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1984, p. 41. Cf. Benjamin's definition of fashion as 'the eternal recurrence of the new', in 'Central Park', trans. Lloyd Spencer, *New German Critique* 34, Winter 1985, p. 46.
46. Henri Meschonnic, 'Modernity, Modernity', *New Literary History*, Vol. 23, 1992, p. 419.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Anderson, 'Modernity and Revolution', p. 101.
49. See, for example, Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*, Verso, London, 1989; David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, pp. 201–323; and, for a critique, Doreen Massey, 'Politics and Space/Time', *New Left Review* 196, November/December 1992.
50. Walter Benjamin, 'N [Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress]' – Konvolut N from the 'Notes and Materials' which make up the Arcades Project – trans. Leigh Hafrey and Richard Sieburth in Gary Smith (ed.), *Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1989, p. 62.
51. Naoki Sakai, 'Modernity and its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism', in Miyoshi, Masao and Harootunian, H.D. (eds), *Postmodernism and Japan*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1989, p. 106.
52. Paz, *Children of the Mire*, p. 23.
53. Sakai, 'Modernity and its Critique', p. 94.
54. Homi Bhabha, 'Race', Time and the Revision of Modernity', in his *The Location of Culture*, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, ch. 12.
55. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, Verso, London, 1993, ch. 1.
56. Immanuel Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent' (1784), in Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphreys, Hackett Publishing Co, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1983, ch. 1.
57. See, for example, Ernst Bloch's analysis of fascism in 'Non-contemporaneity and Obligation to its Dialectic' (1932), in his *Heritage of our Times*, trans. Neville and Stephen Plaice, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 97–148. As Bloch puts it: 'We do not all live in the same now.' Bloch's dialectics raises his work well above the conceptual level of modernization theory, especially in his analyses of the 'hollow' and contradictory time of montage. Nonetheless, its neglect or derogation of the geopolitical determination of differences in historical time restricts it to a struggle at the limits of the paradigm. See, for example, his remark that montage is one form 'of making sure of the old culture perceived from the perspective of *travel and consternation*, no longer of *learning*'. *Ibid.*, p. 208; emphasis added. On the other hand, one might detect here the prefiguration of a critique of postmodern anthropology.
58. For an overview of theories of development, see Jorge Larraín, *Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism and Dependency*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989; especially the historical map on p. 4.
59. Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*, Routledge, London and New York, 1990, pp. 19–20.
60. Fabian, *Time and the Other*, chs 1–3. Fabian's book is fundamental as a critique

of the form of temporality constitutive of anthropology as a discipline, which separated off its object, in principle, from both history and sociology.

61. See Francis Barker et al. (eds), *Postmodernism and the Re-Reading of Modernity*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, in which an earlier version of this chapter appeared.

62. Julia Kristeva, 'Women's Time', in *The Kristeva Reader*, ed. by Toril Moi, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, p. 191.

63. 'Modernity and Revolution', pp. 101–3.

64. My objections to Anderson here are not to his critique of Berman, so much as to his *acceptance* of Berman's characterization of 'modernity' as a dialectic of modernism and modernization. By accepting Berman's account of modernity, Anderson unwittingly becomes complicit in the object of his own critique. His real complaint is against the generic modernism of Berman's version of modernization: his affirmation of the temporal logic of modernity in abstraction from its underlying social dynamics and specific cultural forms. When he extends this critique to aesthetic modernism, however, Anderson is less persuasive. Modernism is indeed a 'perennial' concept, but that is its point. In its deepest and most theoretically productive sense, it is neither a stylistic nor a movement concept – part of an empiricist art history – but a term identifying the immanent historical logic of a particular dynamic of artistic development. It provides a temporal frame for the historical interpretation of works; not that interpretation itself. See Peter Osborne, 'Adorno and the Metaphysics of Modernism: The Problem of a "Postmodern" Art', in Andrew Benjamin (ed.), *The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin*, Routledge, London and New York 1989, pp. 23–48.

It was Benjamin who took as his explicit goal the construction of a form of historical experience 'beyond' the categories of progress and decline. Benjamin, 'N [Re the Theory of Knowledge]', in Smith (ed.), *Benjamin*, pp. 44, 48. In so doing, however, he was explicitly opposing himself to precisely that homogeneous continuum of modern time-consciousness which Anderson accuses of *lacking* a concept of decline.

65. See, for example, Fredric Jameson, 'Nostalgia for the Present', in his *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Verso, London, 1991, ch. 9.

66. See Jürgen Habermas, 'Modernity – An Incomplete Project', trans. Seyla Benhabib, in Hal Foster (ed.), *Postmodern Culture*, Pluto, London, 1985, pp. 3–15.

67. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*.

68. Immanuel Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?', in Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, pp. 41–8. See also Michel Foucault, 'Georges Canguilhem: Philosopher of Error', trans. Graham Burchell, *Ideology and Consciousness* 7, Autumn 1980, pp. 51–62; 'Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution', trans. Colin Gordon, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 88–96; 'What is Enlightenment?', trans. Catherine Porter, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1986, pp. 32–50; Jürgen Habermas, 'Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault's Lecture on Kant's What is Enlightenment?', in his *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate*, ed. and trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, ch. 7. For an example of the way in which this dispute has been taken up by a younger generation of academics in America, see the exchange between John Rajchman and Richard Wolin: Rajchman, 'Habermas's Complaint', *New German Critique* 45, Fall 1988, p. 163–91; Wolin, 'On Misunderstanding Habermas: A Response to Rajchman', *New German Critique* 49, Winter 1990, pp. 139–54; Rajchman, 'Rejoinder to Richard Wolin', *New German Critique* 49, pp. 155–61.

69. In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, it is initially Hegel who is credited with being 'the first to raise to the level of a philosophical problem the process of detaching modernity from the suggestion of norms lying outside of itself in the past' (p. 16). Later in the same volume (p. 295), however, following the remarks in his 1984 memorial address for Foucault ('Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present'), Habermas

concedes Foucault's identification of Kant as the initiator of the discourse. The absence of a discussion of Kant in *The Philosophical Discourse*, where there is no reference to Kant's essay, despite the fact that it is essentially Kant's project that Habermas is defending, is thus extremely unfortunate.

70. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse*, p. 7.

71. Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?', p. 41.

72. Foucault, 'Georges Canguilhem', p. 54; Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), Volume 1, *Reason and the Rationalisation of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Heinemann, London, 1985; Volume 2, *Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987. See also Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, (1944), trans. John Cumming, Verso, London, 1979.

73. Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment?', p. 42.

74. Foucault, 'Georges Canguilhem', p. 54. Note: 'Reason as despotic Enlightenment'; not 'Enlightenment as despotic reason' – a formulation that would commit Foucault to the elaboration of an alternative model of practical reason. For critiques of Foucault along the lines that he is, in any case, so committed, but unable in principle to produce such an alternative, see Peter Dews, 'Power and Subjectivity in Foucault', *New Left Review* 144, March/April 1984, pp. 72-95 and Nancy Fraser, 'Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions', *Praxis International* 1, 1981. This is also Habermas's line in *The Philosophical Discourse*, pp. 266-93, where he accuses Foucault of 'cryptonormativism'.

75. Foucault, 'Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution', p. 95.

76. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 221.

77. Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, p. 97. Cf. the important early essays, 'Contradiction and Overdetermination' (1962) and 'On the Materialist Dialectic' (1963), in Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster, New Left Books, London, 1977, pp. 87-128, 161-218.

78. *Reading Capital*, p. 94.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

80. The inability of Althusser's Marxism to think historical change is notorious. It was the rock on which the whole project foundered. It is ironic that it was precisely because of its supposed political value that Althusser focused on the notion of conjunctural analysis, derived from Lenin, in the first place. Althusser's main objection to the temporality of Hegelianism is that its ontologization of the present 'prevents any anticipation of historical time, any conscious anticipation of the future . . . any knowledge of the future'. Consequently, he argued, there can be for it no 'science of politics': 'no Hegelian politics is possible strictly speaking' (*Reading Capital*, p. 95; cf. *For Marx*, p. 204). In fact, of course, there are at least two types of Hegelian politics: the notorious 'left' and 'right' Hegelianisms. Their error is actually the reverse of that attributed to Hegel by Althusser: namely, their *over*-anticipation of the future, closing it off from what we might call 'unconscious anticipations'. In seeking *knowledge* of the future, Althusser was more of a Hegelian than he realized. Cf. Derrida's remark that anti-Hegelian thinkers tend to come closest to Hegel 'at the very moment when . . . [they are] apparently opposed to Hegel in the most radical fashion'. 'Violence and Metaphysics', in *Writing and Difference* (1967), trans. Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, p. 99.

81. *Reading Capital*, pp. 96-7.

82. The identification of Hegelianism with an everyday or 'ordinary' form of homogeneous time-consciousness derives from §82 of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927), trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwell, Oxford, 1962. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, this identification, mediated by a mutual relation to Aristotle, fails to grasp the temporal specificity of Hegelianism, which has problems of its own. For an extended 'deconstruction' of the relevant passage in Heidegger, see Jacques Derrida, 'Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from *Being and Time*', in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead,

1982, pp. 29–67. For a discussion of Heidegger's account of the 'ordinary conception of time', see pp. 62–8 above.

83. Fernand Braudel, *On History*, trans. Sarah Matthews, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980, p. 49; emphasis added.

84. Perry Anderson, *Arguments within English Marxism*, Verso, London, 1980, pp. 75–6. I am grateful to Gregory Elliott for drawing my attention to this passage.

85. *On History*, p. 34. Braudel describes Marx as 'the first to construct true social models, on the basis of the historical *longue durée*'. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

86. For an alternative account of Althusser's relations to the *Annales* School, emphasizing the convergence between Althusser's distinction between the 'real object' and the 'object of knowledge', and the *Annales*' conception of history as a 'history of problems', see Peter Schöttler, 'Althusser and Annales Historiography – An Impossible Dialogue?', trans. Gregory Elliot, in Michael Sprinker and E. Ann Kaplan (eds), *The Althusserian Legacy*, Verso, London, 1992, pp. 81–98.

87. *Arguments*, p. 75.

88. *Reading Capital*, p. 96.

89. Fabian, *Time and the Other*, pp. 55–6; final emphasis added.

90. See Anderson, *Arguments*, p. 74.

91. *Reading Capital*, p. 106.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

93. Fabian, *Time and the Other*, pp. 156–65.

94. The knowledge of history, according to one of Althusser's more notorious formulations, 'is no more historical than the knowledge of sugar is sweet'. *Reading Capital*, p. 106.

95. See Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Volume 2 (1885), trans. David Fernbach, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978, chs 5, 7, 12–15.

2. One Time, One History?

1. Jameson's view that '[h]istory as ground and untranscendable horizon needs no particular theoretical justification' (Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*, Methuen, London, 1981, p. 102), whilst appealing, contradicts itself in the act of its articulation, by using just such a phenomenological category – 'untranscendable horizon' – which consequently remains unexamined.

2. Wilhelm Dilthey, 'The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies', in *Selected Writings*, trans. and ed. H.P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976; Heinrich Rickert, *Science and History: A Critique of Positivist Epistemology*, trans. George Reisman, ed. Arthur Godard, D. Ven Nostrand, Princeton, 1962; Martin Heidegger, 'The Concept of Time in the Science of History' (1916), trans. H.S. Taylor and H.W. Ufflemann, *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*, Vol. 9, no. 1, 1978, pp. 3–10.

3. Herbert Schnadelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, ch. 2. See also Lukács's remarks in the introduction to his *The Young Hegel* (1948), trans. Rodney Livingstone, Merlin Press, London, 1975, p. xvi, concerning 'the victory in neo-Kantianism of the Schopenhauerian line of the history of philosophy' and the subsequent attempt 'to press Hegel's philosophy into the service of an imperialist, reactionary restructuring of neo-Kantianism'. Dilthey is subjected to particular scorn.

4. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 'The German Ideology' (1845), in their *Collected Works* Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1975–89 – Volume 5, p. 37. Cf. Raymond Aron's definition of the object of the philosophy of history as 'synthesis (choice, interpretation, the organisation of the material)', rather than the merely methodological critique of its scientific preliminaries, in his *Introduction to the*

Philosophy of History: An Essay on the Limits of Historical Objectivity (1938; 1948), trans. George J. Irwin Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1961, p. 9.

5. Engels, *Anti-Dühring: Herr Dühring's Revolution in Science* (1878), trans. Emile Burns, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1947, Pt I and *Dialectics of Nature*, trans. Clemens Dutt, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1934. The latter was never published in Engels's lifetime. It first appeared in full only in 1925, in a Soviet edition, one year after the publication of Stalin's *The Foundations of Leninism*.

6. Russell Jacoby, *Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.

7. See, for example, 'Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism', in Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Heinemann, London, 1979. In her brief discussion of neo-Kantian Marxism (*Hegel Contra Sociology*, Athlone Press, London, 1981, pp. 24-38), Gillian Rose back-dates this tendency to include both Lukács and Adorno, extending Lukács's idea of a neo-Kantian neo-Hegelianism to envelop Lukács himself.

8. See n. 2 to ch. 1, above.

9. Paul Ricoeur, *The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, and 'History and Narrative', Pt II of *TN* 1. For the Anglo-American literature, see Patrick Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*, Free Press, New York, 1959. Althusser's brief engagement with the *Annales* School is a rare example of an exchange between Marxism and this tradition. A belated Soviet engagement with the analytical literature is Eero Loone, *Soviet Marxism and the Analytical Philosophies of Histories* (1980), trans. Brian Pearce, Verso, London, 1992.

10. As Aron puts it (*Introduction*, p. 44): 'There exists no science of history whose validity would impose acceptance as inevitably as did the Newtonian physics in the case of Kant.' This is even more so today than at the time of Aron's book (the 1930s).

11. For a brilliant example of this, see Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History* (1975), trans. Tom Conley, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988, especially Pt I.

12. Aron, *Introduction*, p. 10.

13. Paul Ricoeur, 'Objectivity and Subjectivity in History' (1952), in *History and Truth*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1965, p. 24.

14. Marc Bloch, 'History, Men, and Time', in *The Historian's Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1954, pp. 20-47. Note the title of the influential British journal founded in 1952 in the spirit of the *Annales* School: *Past and Present*.

15. See for example, Fidel Castro, *History Will Absolve Me*, Book Institute, Havana, 1963.

16. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)*, trans. Martin Nicolaus, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 109.

17. See Fernand Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce: Civilisation and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*, Volume 2, trans. Sian Reynolds, Collins, London, 1982; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, Academic Press, London, 1974; T.H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin (eds), *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

18. Jacques Le Goff, 'Labour-Time in the "Crisis" of the Fourteenth Century: From Medieval Time to Modern Time' (1963), in his *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1989, pp. 43-57; E.P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism', *Past and Present* 38, 1967, pp. 56-97; Frederick Cooper, 'Colonising Time: Work Rhythms and Labour Conflict in Colonial Mombasa', in Nicholas B. Dirks (ed.),

Colonialism and Culture, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1992, pp. 209-46.

19. Eviatar Zerubavel, 'The Standardisation of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 88, no. 1, 1982, pp. 1-23. Important background conditions to the imposition of the quantifiable continuum of a homogeneous clock-time in early capitalism include the development of the schedule as a way of regulating life in Benedictine Monasteries, and the increasing autonomy established by merchants' time from church time during the course of the fourteenth century. See Eviatar Zerubavel, 'The Benedictine Ethic and the Modern Spirit of Scheduling: On Schedules and Social Life', *Sociological Inquiry* 50, pp. 157-69, and Le Goff, 'Merchant's Time and Church's Time in the Middle Ages' (1960), in *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, pp. 29-42.

20. The theoretical basis for the application of an abstractly chronological conception of time to history was laid by the discovery of geological time, which destroyed the restricted theological time-scales of creationism. See Stephen Jay Gould, *Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988.

21. Pierre Vilar, 'Marxist History, A History in the Making: Towards a Dialogue with Althusser', *New Left Review* 80, July/August 1973, p. 105. It is important to distinguish here between the idea of 'history as world history', in the fully global sense, and Wallerstein's idea of a 'world system', which is both relative to the state of the social unification of the globe at any one time and essentially structural (that is, synchronic/diachronic) in its conception of time. See, for example, the account of an earlier 'world system', prior to the establishment of relations between the Americas and other continents, in Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before Europe's Hegemony: The World System, A.D. 1250-1350*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1989.

22. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Scattered Speculations on the Question of Culture Studies', in her *Outside in the Teaching Machine*, Routledge, New York and London, 1993, p. 256.

23. Vilar, 'Marxist History', p. 106.

24. *The Political Unconscious*, p. 28; emphasis added.

25. See, for example, the account of the dialectic of projection and planning in the secret societies of the masons in eighteenth-century Germany, in Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society* (1959), Berg, New York, 1988, ch. 9.

26. Karl Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Volume 5, p. 3.

27. Theodor W. Adorno, 'Geschichte-Philosophie', unpublished lecture series, p. 19, quoted in Robert Hullot-Kentor, 'Back to Adorno', *Telos* 81, Fall 1989, p. 13.

28. Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957), Routledge, London, 1960.

29. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, pp. 47, 49.

30. Jacques Derrida, 'From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve', in *Writing and Difference*, p. 260.

31. Cf. Agnes Heller, *A Philosophy of History in Fragments*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, chs 1 and 6.

32. Lutz Niethammer, *Posthistoire: Has History Come to an End?*, trans. Patrick Camiller, Verso, London and New York, 1992, pp. 137, 144, 149.

33. The stimulus has, of course, been Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18, later expanded into *The End of History and the Last Man*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1992.

34. It is the structure of Hegel's conception of the rationality of the historical present that I am concerned with here, not his own account of its content, as represented by the politics of his *Philosophy of Right*.

35. See Joseph McCarney, 'Endgame', *Radical Philosophy* 62, Autumn 1992, pp. 35-8.