

Going Back

Heidegger, East Asia and 'the West'

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Heidegger's influence on some important strands of modern East Asian, and particularly Japanese, philosophy is well known. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s a number of scholars who would become major figures in Japanese philosophy (such as Miki Kiyoshi and Nishitani Keiji) visited Heidegger and attended his lectures. Heidegger's work was embraced, disseminated and even canonized in some Japanese schools of thought long before it made a significant mark on European philosophy. Tanabe Hajime's 1924 Japanese-language essay 'A New Turn in Phenomenology: Heidegger's Philosophy of Life' is widely thought to be the first substantial commentary on Heidegger in any language. Kuki Shuzo's 1933 *The Philosophy of Heidegger* (again, in Japanese) was the first book-length study in any language.¹ *Being and Time* was translated into Japanese in 1939, twenty-three years before the first English translation, and five further Japanese translations of the work appeared in the following thirty years.² Of these Japanese philosophers Miki Kiyoshi was the only one seriously to criticize Heidegger after 1933; he was also the only Marxist. The most influential reception of Heidegger's work fed into the philosophical justification of fascism in Japan, as Tanabe's writings in particular show.³

It is interesting, therefore, that most of the now voluminous literature on the relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and East Asian thought centres on what Reinhard May calls the 'correspondences' between Heidegger's work and *ancient* Chinese and *ancient* Indian thought,⁴ 'correspondences' which perhaps explain, to some degree, the ease with which Heidegger was read in twentieth-century China and Japan. (Heidegger's Japanese interlocutors and students often expressed amazement at the tendency of Heidegger's German contemporaries to find his work obscure and difficult.) In his early work on Heidegger, Graham Parkes even spoke of 'congruencies' between Heidegger's work and these ancient sources being 'pat-

terned by some thing, event, or process'.⁵ More recent work suggests the rethinking of these congruencies in terms of the disavowed influence of ancient East Asian sources on Heidegger's philosophy, bringing them into even closer relation.

This article comprises a critical examination of some aspects of the English-language comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought. It questions both its transcendental conceptual ground – the conditions of possibility for the comparative exercise – and its account of Heidegger's philosophy itself. For the comparative literature, I will argue, can only make its specific claims, sympathetic to the Heideggerian philosophical project, with a reading of that project that represses most of what is fundamental to Heidegger's conception of philosophy and almost everything that we know about his politics. Furthermore, in its emphasis on the ancient it facilitates the repression of the history of Heideggerian fascism in modern East Asian, and particularly Japanese, thought. The point of this critical examination of the comparative literature is not, however, to expose a misreading of Heidegger. It is to reveal what is at stake in the mobilization of the imaginary geopolitical and geophilosophical unities of 'the East' and 'the West' in relation to Heidegger's political-philosophical thinking of 'the West'. Accordingly, I will look first at the claims typical in the advocatory comparative literature and then at the problematic conceptual ground of the comparison, both in terms of its immanent logic and its relation to Heidegger's conception of the history of philosophy.

The claims

The comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought is surprisingly large. The basic motivation and the substantial content of its main strand is well represented by Joan Stambaugh (translator of many of Heidegger's works, including *Being and Time*),

who finds 'a basic compatibility' between Daoism and Heidegger's attempt to think beyond metaphysics.⁶ Central to this, as to many of the compatibilist claims, is Heidegger's 1929 lecture 'What is Metaphysics?', where the nothing is thought beyond its traditional metaphysical definition, that is, beyond its definition as 'the complete negation of the totality of beings': 'The nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings.'⁷ For many commentators, Heidegger's attempt to think 'Nothing' outside of the Western history of nihilism (nihilism, that is, as Heidegger understands it: 'The essence of nihilism is the history in which there is nothing to being itself'⁸) is most easily understood in terms of the non-dualism of Daoist thought and the basic Daoist insight, as Reinhard May puts it, of the 'correspondence between being and nothing'. Other 'resonances' (to use Graham Parkes's word)⁹ between Heidegger's philosophy and ancient East Asian sources are not difficult to find. Translations of the 'the *dao*' as 'the way' give rise to obvious comparisons between this 'way' and Heidegger's 'ways' (*Wege*) of thought, between this 'way' and Heidegger's 'Saying',¹⁰ and even to an identification of the *dao* with what Heidegger calls Being itself.¹¹ The prominent place of death in Daoist thought may also be compared to the place of death in *Being and Time*,¹² the role of silence in Zen may be compared with the place of silence in Heidegger's later work,¹³ and this by no means exhausts the comparative field.

It is often implied, almost by way of justification of the comparative project, that the discovery and explication of these parallels may help us to better understand or appreciate the significance of Heidegger's thought. This claim is in turn justified by reference to Heidegger's well-documented interest in ancient East Asian thought. In many of the published reminiscences of friends and students of Heidegger, and in other records of conversations and letters between Heidegger and others, it is clear that Heidegger was familiar with much ancient Chinese and Indian philosophy as it has survived in the form of the texts we know today. Heidegger had already been introduced to some of these texts by the early 1920s, it seems, and often discussed them, particularly with his Japanese interlocutors. From the standpoint of the current relative ignorance in the Western philosophical academy concerning ancient Chinese and Indian sources, Heidegger's knowledge may seem remarkable. But Heidegger and his contemporaries lived, institutionally, in the wake of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German Romantic traditions in which knowledge of

these texts – both originals and translations – was not uncommon. (Martin Buber, Rudolf Otto, Max Scheler, Karl Jaspers and Karl Löwith all had interests in Asian thought.) Reinhard May, Graham Parkes and others cite Heidegger's familiarity with Buber's *Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse*, a German translation of the *Zhuangzi* (or *Chuanz-tzu*) anthology, one of the two major works of Daoism.¹⁴ To find this tradition upheld by an old-fashioned scholar of Heidegger's ilk is not surprising, and there is no doubt, May says, that although Heidegger could not read Chinese, he 'valued and appreciated East Asian thought, and Daoist ideas above all.'¹⁵ In most of the comparative literature, then, the congruencies between Heidegger's philosophy and East Asian thought are not explained as cosmic parallels, but justified – to a greater or lesser extent – with reference to Heidegger's 'clearly stated interest in Eastern thinking'.¹⁶ Heidegger, that is, is presented as having led the way in East–West comparative philosophical studies, and the extension of the comparison to his own work is therefore natural.

However, even limiting the discussion here to a consideration of the English-language literature on Heidegger's relationship to ancient Chinese (specifically Daoist) sources, it is immediately obvious that there is more to the comparative literature than the mere noting of congruencies. Studies in comparative philosophy, as in comparative religion, literature, anthropology and so on, are always in part ideological enterprises. And the context of the comparative literature on Heidegger reveals, in a particularly explicit manner, a major ideological issue in the field of comparative philosophy more generally: the geopolitical contestation of the definition of philosophy itself.


The history of modern Western philosophy includes – and not just as an interlude – the oft-repeated claim that, as one of the West's 'others', China not only in fact never produced an indigenous properly 'philosophical' tradition, but was necessarily incapable of doing so; either because of the various alleged conceptual and grammatical inadequacies of Chinese or because of the regrettable absence of Western political forms in China. To an extent, the comparative literature in English is based on the presumption that this claim is wrong and on the desire to open 'the West' up to dialogue with the philosophical traditions of 'the East'. (Thus Elisabeth Feist Hirsch writes: 'In an age of constantly narrowing distances between nations it is most important that East and West not only come to a deeper appreciation of their respective intellectual commitments, but that they communicate with each other in the true sense of the word.'¹⁷) This

essentially well-meaning urge is often true of Euro-American comparative studies more generally, but it has a peculiar twist in the case of comparisons with Heidegger: what, for the history of modern Western philosophy, constitutes the inadequacies of Chinese language and thought, constitutes, for the comparative literature, its precise superiority and its point of contact with Heidegger.

China, it is said, did not ever have, nor did its peoples ever feel the need for, 'metaphysics'. For sinologists like Joseph Needham, unacquainted with the philosophy of Heidegger, this refers to the absence of those distinctions, which, for many, are the *sine qua non* of Western philosophy. In the second volume of the massive multi-volume *Science and Civilization in China*, edited by Needham until his death, he writes:

we believe that the Chinese mind throughout the ages did not, on the whole, feel the need for metaphysics; physical Nature (with all that implied at the highest levels) sufficed. The Chinese were extremely loath to separate the One from the many or the 'spiritual' from the 'material'. Organic naturalism was their *philosophia perennis*.¹⁸

While Needham means these remarks to be complimentary, others descriptions are less sympathetic. One chapter of Hajime Nakamura's *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, entitled 'Non-Development of Abstract Thought', claims that the 'Lack of Consciousness of Universals' (a section title) is 'symptomatic of the general lack of consciousness of *genus* and *differentia* in the abstract among the Chinese'. The 'Lack of Conscious Use of General Laws' and the 'Grammatical Ambiguity of Chinese Language and Thought' (more section titles) means that '[w]e should not expect ... the Chinese language would be as suitable as the Greek for philosophizing'. The Japanese (which 'has had, at least in the past, a structure unfit for expressing logical conceptions', and other 'defects') is likewise considered inferior in comparison with the Sanskrit, Greek and German.¹⁹ Nakamura, himself Japanese, clearly adduces these conceptual and linguistic differences as evidence of the superiority of Western models of philosophical thinking. These same differences, however, read through another optic, are the basis for the claim that Heidegger's project of the overcoming of metaphysics finds 'resonances' in the ancient sources, which – with their non-dualistic logic and this-worldly emphasis – had, as Needham says, 'persistently eluded all metaphysics'.²⁰ That is to say, the characteristics Nakamura finds lacking in Chinese thought – preponderantly, the characteristics of a philosophical practice founded on Aristotelian logical categories – are easily



identified with the categories of Western metaphysics, as Heidegger understands it. For Graham Parkes, finding these parallels with 'a non- and anti-metaphysical philosophy from a totally different historical and cultural situation lend[s] considerable weight to Heidegger's claim to have succeeded in overcoming the western metaphysical tradition'.²¹

The discussion of these correspondences, congruencies and compatibilities took a different turn, however, with the publication in 1989 of Reinhard May's *Heidegger's Hidden Sources* (translated into English in 1996). May refers his readers to Nakamura's section on 'Non-development of Metaphysics', as well as to Needham's comments, for authoritative support for his claims about Chinese philosophy, claims that are the basis of the ensuing comparison with what he sees as the most fundamental philosophical commitments of Heidegger's work.²² To this extent, May's book is not at odds with what we could call the mainstream of the comparative literature. However, his central claim is considerably stronger than anything previously found in it. His claim is that Heidegger's work from the mid-1920s, if not before, was influenced by these East Asian sources to 'a hitherto unrecognized extent', and that 'it seems probable that Heidegger, without stating his sources, in a number of cases of central importance *appropriated* ideas germane to his work from German translations primarily of Daoist classics but presumably of Zen Buddhist texts as well'.²³ May

claims, explicitly, that Heidegger sought and found his new beginning in philosophy from these East Asian sources, although Heidegger would never openly acknowledge this.²⁴ Interpreting some of Heidegger's retrospective marginal notes in *Being and Time*, May implies that Heidegger's indebtedness to these sources extends even to the thinking of Being itself. Documenting the various ancient East Asian texts and thinkers with which Heidegger was undoubtedly familiar and comparing these – in great detail – with many of the major themes in Heidegger's work leads May to the following conclusion:

Where [Heidegger's] thinking has from early on received its ('silent') directive from is now not difficult to surmise. *From ancient Chinese thought* – for metaphysics, so conceived, was never developed there. Being neither indebted to Aristotelian logic nor receptive to an ontology involving a subject–object dichotomy, nor, above all, being conditioned by any theology, ancient Chinese thought was completely remote from the assertion of 'eternal truths', which belong according to Heidegger 'to the residue of Christian theology that has still not been properly eradicated from philosophical problematics'.²⁵

Graham Parkes, May's English translator, is thoroughly convinced by May's evidence and has pursued these claims further.

The comparison

There thus seem to be two different types of claims in the comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought: claims about 'resonances' and claims about Heidegger's secret indebtedness. However, in so far as they are both dependent on an untheorized logic of comparison, the basis and the specific content of both types of claims are, I will suggest, dubious on several counts.

First, a comparison, if it is to retain its status *as* comparative, generally requires a context including – crucially – some mediating third term, distinct from either of the comparandae (here, Heidegger's philosophy and ancient Chinese thought) according to which the comparandae are compared. In the English-language literature under discussion here that third term is most often defined negatively as the absence (in Chinese thought) or the overcoming (in Heidegger) of 'Western metaphysics'. As noted, both the traditional and the specifically Heideggerian senses of the history of Western philosophy as metaphysics seem to exclude consideration of Chinese thought as philosophy in a certain sense, albeit with a different understanding of what is implied in this exclusion. However, the same thing that, from the traditional Western philo-

sophical perspective, writes China *out* of the history of philosophy, assures its entry *into* that same history, from the *equally but differently Western* Heideggerian perspective of the overcoming of Western metaphysics. This structure of internality besets the comparative literature: that is, its alleged East–West dialogue, conducted from the point of view, and according to the preoccupations, of the West (here, the overcoming of Western metaphysics), is primarily a dialogue of the West with itself. Accordingly, the epitome of the comparative literature on Heidegger is an essay written by Heidegger himself, translated into English as 'A Dialogue on Language: Between a Japanese and an Enquirer', a text which, according to Heidegger, 'originated in 1953/54, on the occasion of a visit by Professor Tezuka of the Imperial University, Tokyo', but one in which the parts of both 'the Japanese' and the 'Inquirer' are in fact played by Heidegger.²⁶

May treats this essay as something of a scandal, as if Heidegger was trying to pretend that the words spoken by 'a Japanese' should be directly attributable to Tezuka. Although there is something a little creepy about the dialogue (Heidegger is unstinting in his praise for his own work through the mouth of 'the Japanese'), it is not misleading in the way May suggests: most readers would probably presume that Heidegger plays both parts in this dialogue, just as most readers assume that Plato wrote all the parts in his. This kind of one-sided exchange, in which the position of only one of the interlocutors is properly developed, is also a recognizable genre, 'standard practice in traditional dialogues in both East and West', of which Malebranche's 1708 dialogue between a Christian and a Chinese philosopher is a notable example.²⁷ If Heidegger's 'Dialogue' is only a 'dialogue' in the sense that that word names a particular genre of writing, its content is preoccupied with the issue of the possibility or impossibility of an East–West dialogue in a deeper sense. While May reads it as proof both of Heidegger's indebtedness to East Asian sources and his attempts to cover this over, it is equally plausibly read as a statement of Heidegger's belief in the fundamental and incommensurable *differences* between philosophical traditions, and of the extraordinary difficulty, if not the impossibility, of a true dialogue, despite the best intentions of the interlocutors.²⁸

Even where the comparative literature acknowledges in some way the problem of internality it does not manage to avoid it. Michael Heim, for example, begins his essay 'A Philosophy of Comparison: Heidegger and Lao Tzu' with the claim that the notion of 'comparison' animating such studies needs articulation in a philosophy of comparison (not just comparative

philosophy), and that the 'place' of such a philosophy is not outside or above the comparandae but somehow *between* them. The empirical fact of 'the interpenetration of East and West' means that comparative philosophy can no longer orient itself 'on a simple geographical or cultural duality', and as the reality of 'international communication' is really the homogenization of communication 'in a planetary culture [that] is the triumph of Western technology coupled with the culmination of the logos tradition' (by which he means the hegemony of 'the ideological public statement' as distinct from 'personal human truth'), the category of the 'unspeakable' is deployed as the 'free opening' or 'negative space' in which comparative philosophy might operate. However, this 'negative space' (between, for example, Heidegger and Lao Tzu) 'can be characterized in any set of philosophies by showing in what way the comparandae contribute to the culmination of the logos tradition in the unspeakable or in what way the comparandae contribute to the cultivation of the unsayable'.²⁹ That is, the negative space between Heidegger and Lao Tzu is characterized, ultimately, in wholly Heideggerian terms. (It may be, of course, that the discourse of Heideggerianism is constitutively incapable of reflection in non-Heideggerian terms, but that is another story.)

These sorts of criticism apply, most obviously, to the comparative literature that sets out to uncover resonances between Heidegger's philosophy and East Asian thought across the millennia. And, at first sight, it looks like the stronger claims made by May and Parkes avoid them, both in the historical location of a series of appropriations, and in the privileging of the ancient Chinese sources in the comparison – Heidegger's philosophical categories being, in some sense, a 'translation' of these sources. In fact, I will argue, these stronger claims are subject to the same logic of comparison, and thus suffer from the same internality.

Stepping back, briefly, into Heidegger's history of philosophy, how should we understand its conception of the overcoming of Western metaphysics, the success of which is crucial to many of the claims in the comparative literature? The answer to this is complex, but one thing seems clear. There is no question of a clean break, no question of two separate histories of metaphysical and post-metaphysical thinking or of a leaping outside of the history of Western metaphysics. This is evident in Heidegger's incessant return to the texts that comprise that history, not only empirically (in the fact of the return) but also more fundamentally, in the animating belief in the necessity of that return

and in what is thereby to be achieved. The project of the overcoming of Western metaphysics, where 'Western metaphysics' means, above all, the understanding of the Being of beings as constant presence, is not achieved through the dismissal of its history, but by paying attention to its own hints at another concealingly-unconcealed understanding of Being. Of course, the word 'Being' itself belongs to what Heidegger calls 'the patrimony of the language of metaphysics',³⁰ which would lead, among other experiments, to its being crossed through and to the restoration of its archaic German spelling (*Sein*);³¹ but never to its abandonment.

It is remarkable, then, that one subject rarely broached in the comparative literature on Heidegger is the absence in Chinese of the verb 'to be' and of the abstract noun 'Being'.³² In the exclusion of Chinese thought from the realm of the philosophical in the traditional history of Western philosophy and its others, this 'lack' was often considered decisive. That is, for many, this was *the* mark of the Chinese incapacity for metaphysical thought, a presumption in which the linguistic and the anthropological were inseparably entwined, hence the tendency (unbelievably, still not yet dead) to speak of 'the Chinese mind' (a truly astonishing construction of the unity of China).³³ If the claim in the comparative literature is that it is the non-metaphysical aspects of Chinese thought that bear comparison with Heidegger's philosophy, then this, perhaps the most un-metaphysical aspect of all, ought surely to be foregrounded.

That it is not foregrounded may at first sight appear as the passing over of an embarrassing *lack* of resonance devastating for the comparative case. This is not actually quite so, but it is intriguing. Heidegger, as is well known, repeatedly refers to the importance for him of Aristotle's posing the question of the meaning of being, more particularly his observation that being is said in many ways.³⁴ In separating out the different senses of being, Aristotle distinguishes what we now call the copulative and the existential senses of being, although confusion of these two senses continued to cause problems in philosophy for many centuries. For some, however, it is the illusion of an overarching unity of the sense of being – an effect of the inherent ambiguity of the verb and of the capacity for Indo-European languages to derive from it an abstract noun – that is *the* mistake in Western philosophy. In the eyes of at least one prominent sinologist, the absence of the verb 'to be' and of a unifying concept of being is one of the main features *recommending* ancient Chinese philosophy. According to A.C. Graham, 'Classical

Chinese deals with the various functions covered by our verb “to be” by means of at least six different sets of words and constructions, several of which have other functions outside the scope of “to be”.³⁵ In particular, Classical Chinese has different and specific words for the copulative and the existential senses of the word ‘being’, thus avoiding the kind of confusion germane, for example, to Anselm’s ontological argument. In translating Anselm’s argument without the benefit of an ambiguous verb ‘to be’, Chinese translators have, according to Graham, coined a new word with the syntax of the English ‘exist’ (a syntax otherwise foreign to Chinese), a word that has no function in the language except in the translation of Western texts. One may thus, he says, ‘introduce into Chinese thought the error of treating existence as a predicate, which it took the West 2000 years to expose’.³⁶

Graham did not, unfortunately, ever discuss the Chinese translations of *Being and Time*. However, his philosophical position on fundamental ontology may be extrapolated from his various remarks about ‘the oddity of the Western tradition ... in which the concept of Being covers the whole range of the Indo-European verb “to be”’.³⁷ For Graham, the fact that symbolic logic has no symbol for being in this sense³⁸ and that everyday use of the verb ‘to be’ is almost exclusively copulative (the existential functions having been taken over by phrases such as ‘there is’, ‘il y a’, ‘es gibt’) suggests that philosophers should abandon ‘being’ as

1. “存在”是“最普遍的”概念: τὸ ὄν ἐστὶ καθόλου
μαλίστα παντῶν ② Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit. “無論一個人於存在者處把握到的是什麼，這種把握總已經包含了對存在的某種領悟。”③

① “Ontologie”一詞，傳統的中文譯法為“本體論”。這個詞的原意實際為“關於存在的學說”。因為後人將“存在”解釋為與“現象”相對的“本體”，這個詞自然就以“本體論”一譯流傳至今。本書中，作者的主張目標之一就是要破“現象”、“本體”之二分，除却對“存在”理解的千年之蔽。因此，譯文將“Ontologie”一詞改譯為“存在論”，與之相應，從文中經常出現的“ontologisch”作為“Ontologie”的形容詞形式被譯為“存在論上的”——中譯註

②亞里士多德：《形而上學》B₄ 1001^a21

③聖托馬斯·阿奎那(Thomas V.A.S.)《神學大全》11^o qu. 94^a2

incurably ambiguous. The ghost of the old concept still walks, he says, ‘but one may well ask in what sense Western thinkers, however confidently they may talk of Being, may be said to retain a concept which no longer has a place in either their natural or their artificial languages.’³⁹

For Graham, one of the virtues of ancient Chinese philosophy is that in ‘lacking’ the concept of Being it is non-metaphysical, in the sense that logical positivists demand that philosophy be non-metaphysical (that is, anti-metaphysical). Graham’s objection is that ‘being’ is ambiguous, and that we should therefore drop it in philosophy, but this is the kind of objection on which Heidegger pours scorn in the opening pages of *Being and Time*. It is not an objection that the authors of the comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought are therefore likely to countenance. This is a complex linguistic issue, but if a concept of Being is peculiar to Indo-European languages and absent in Chinese, and if Heidegger continues to speak of Being as differentiated from all ontic determinations of beings, it is difficult to see how this does not mark a decisive *dissimilarity* with ancient Chinese philosophy, and it would make more sense to say that Heidegger *failed* to learn from it, than that it was his inspiration.

However, as Heidegger was reading German translations of Classical Chinese that imposed categories from Western philosophy (as a necessity of translation) there would still be grounds to claim, as May does, that these texts were influential. A large part of May’s case against Heidegger is the argument that the (silent) appropriation of one basic insight forms the basis of Heidegger’s discussion of the nothing in ‘What is Metaphysics?’ and *An Introduction to*

Metaphysics, specifically: ‘The East Asian way of thinking distinguishes itself in Daoism through the ancient insight, embodied in chapter 2 of the *Laozi*, to the effect that *yu* (being) and *wu* (nothing) mutually produce one another.’⁴⁰ This looks like a translation of the Chinese characters into English (German in May’s original), but, according to Graham’s argument above, it must be equally, if not more so, a translation of the German/English concept *back into* the Chinese. In that case, however, the alleged affinity is between Heidegger’s philosophy and *Western renderings* of ‘East Asian thought’

which, once again, are really a dialogue of the West with itself, having ‘discovered’ its own categories in the thought of another tradition. This is certainly how much of the comparative literature – albeit unwittingly – expresses the relation. Feist Hirsch, for example, writes that ‘Zen Buddhism ... arrives at the conclusion

that the world man lives in points to Buddhahood. Thus Zen agrees with Heidegger's view to the effect that Being-there transcends toward Being.⁴¹ May's reversal, despite appearances to the contrary, cannot but fall under the same suspicion. In this case the mediating third term of the comparison, here an understanding of Being in some way 'beyond' Western metaphysics, is really internal to one of the comparanda and imposed on the other, as is most clear in Feist Hirsch's claim.

'The West'

Exposing this structure of internality is not intended as a criticism of the motivation of the comparative literature so much as an argument for the necessity for critical reflection on its immanent logic and its founding categories, 'the 'East' and the 'West'. The need is particularly acute in comparative studies on Heidegger and 'the East' *not* because Heidegger fails to address the function of these categories, but, on the contrary, precisely because of the way in which he makes an articulation of the category of 'the West' central to his philosophical concerns. Any attempt to compare the specificity of Heidegger's philosophy and any 'Eastern' source must surely take this articulation into account. That the comparative literature does not do this further undermines the viability of the comparison between Heidegger's philosophy and East Asian thought, on grounds immanent to Heidegger's philosophy itself. For important aspects of the comparative case can in fact only be made when Heidegger is rendered un-Heideggerian with respect to some of his fundamental philosophical commitments regarding 'the West'. This argument needs to be made against the comparative literature, I will argue, *not* as a defence of Heidegger against May et al., but in order to remove an obstacle to criticism of Heidegger, criticism that the comparative literature neutralizes and in so neutralizing obviates its own best impulse.

This is clearest in the elaboration and justification of May's and Parkes's stronger claim about the East Asian influence on Heidegger: the idea that these similarities are not coincidental (as Parkes previously believed) but evidence of Heidegger's 'clandestine'⁴² indebtedness, more fundamental to his thought than any indebtedness to the Western tradition. In pursuing these claims further Parkes concludes, too, that Heidegger not only kept silent about the debt he owed to these sources, but disavowed them; more bluntly, he lied.

To anyone familiar with certain of Heidegger's silences and his revisionist memories of relations and allegiances, this is all too easy to believe. Still, neither May nor Parkes actually give a reason for Heidegger's

reticence or dishonesty here. May quotes Heidegger referring more or less obliquely to his 'hidden sources' (Heidegger's own phrase⁴³), and of a 'deeply hidden kinship' between his thinking and aspects of Japanese thought: 'In other words, he speaks of a connection based on his adoption of some essential traits of East Asian thinking which, for reasons easy to understand, he declined to reveal.'⁴⁴ May contrasts the details of his comparison between Heidegger's philosophy and the ancient East Asian sources with the very few published references to East Asian thought in Heidegger's work and with his explicit denials of their influence or of the current importance of these texts for Western thinkers, but concludes that Heidegger left behind 'well-encoded signs of a *confession*'.⁴⁵ He ends his book, not with a criticism of Heidegger, but with the idea that Heidegger 'has paid tribute in a unique way' to the West's task to devote itself to non-Western thinking: 'Heidegger has, in his own special way, demonstrated the necessity of *transcultural* thinking.'⁴⁶ Similarly, despite Heidegger's 'reticence' in acknowledging his debts, Parkes concludes that to the extent that May's demonstration is successful, 'rather than diminish Heidegger's significance as a thinker it makes him in many ways even more interesting'.⁴⁷ Further, Parkes suggests that in bringing these hidden sources to light May operates in accord with Heidegger's own method, thinking what is unthought in Heidegger's texts, following Heidegger's own maxim in his lecture course on Plato's *Sophist*: 'It is in any case a dubious thing to rely on what an author himself has brought to the forefront. The important thing is rather to give attention to those things he left shrouded in silence.'⁴⁸ What, however, remains shrouded in silence in the comparative literature itself?

Remarking that 'the Eurocentrism of so much Heidegger scholarship in the West has rendered it oblivious to the long and interesting history of the reception of Heidegger's ideas in the non-Western intellectual world',⁴⁹ Parkes's implication seems to be that Heidegger's work is not *itself* Eurocentric. Heidegger's frequent remarks about Europe, and especially about the historic role of the ancient Greeks and the destiny of the German people, are left uncriticized and unexamined. What is in fact obvious in Heidegger's reluctance to 'admit' the East Asian influence on his work – namely, the profoundly, almost parodically, Eurocentric commitment at the heart of his philosophy – simply vanishes. That is, it is vanished in and by the comparisons with 'Eastern' sources. This is not only because these aspects of Heidegger's work must be among the most embarrassing paragraphs for his

sympathetic readers, second only – but intimately related to – his enthusiasm for German ‘National Socialism’. It is also because the philosophical position expressed in them is profoundly at odds with the comparative project.

It would be easy enough to pick one’s way through Heidegger’s work and find numerous references to the essentially Greek nature of Western philosophy and to the necessity to return to the Greek origin. I shall quote just one example. In the interview with *Der Spiegel* (conducted in 1966) Heidegger says of the ‘reversal’ – that is, the overcoming – of the technicization of the modern world, which is the ‘completion’ or result of Western metaphysics:

it is my conviction that a reversal can be prepared only in the same place in the world where the modern technological world originated, and that it cannot happen because of any takeover by Zen Buddhism or any other Eastern experiences of the world. There is a need for a rethinking which is to be carried out with the help of the European tradition and of a new appropriation of that tradition. Thinking itself can be transformed only by a thinking which has the *same origin* and calling.⁵⁰

May says we must understand this passage as ‘a tactically necessary “cover-up” manoeuvre that turned out to be necessary for the preservation of his secret’. Parkes says Heidegger’s denial, in a letter to Jaspers, of any ‘resonances with Eastern thinking’ in his work ‘speaks volumes’, by which he seems to want to suggest that the denial is itself a covert admission.⁵¹ The major presumption of the comparative literature – both *in extremis* in May and less combatively in Parkes and elsewhere – is thus that remarks and denials such as these must either be taken to be extra-philosophical opinions that say something about the man but not about the philosophy (as many would read Heidegger’s political ‘opinions’ too), or they must be taken to represent a philosophical position that somehow contradicts the true Heidegger or the true Heideggerian philosophy. This is a familiar tactic in many apologetic discussions of the racist or sexist or misogynistic ‘opinions’ of various philosophers; a tactic recently and persuasively criticized by Robert Bernasconi.⁵² According to this way of reading, Heidegger’s remarks must be taken to be reprehensible, as lies or mistruths, but may be dismissed.

In fact, Heidegger’s remarks are perfectly consonant with, perhaps even exemplary of, philosophical commitments that were evident in his work before the 1920s and which endured to the end – turns and new beginnings notwithstanding. The peculiar form of Heidegger’s basic insistence on the historicity of

Dasein means that we are supposedly indebted to the Greek origin ‘which goes to the essence of our *Dasein*, i.e., its total existence’. In *The Essence of Truth*, for example (the lecture course from 1931/2), we are said to ‘remain bonded and obligated to that beginning whether we know it or not ... our Dasein stands in the history of the beginning of Western philosophy’ and contemporary life, even the fact that today we ‘travel by tram ... means nothing else but that the beginning of Western philosophy, albeit without our recognizing it, is immediately *effective*’.⁵³ For ‘us’, then, going back to the Greek origin, trying to grasp the Greek understanding of being, is ‘not a matter of acquiring external historical knowledge’, but of investigating its ‘constant (albeit hidden) influence on our contemporary existence’.⁵⁴

If, as Heidegger claims, ‘man finds the proper abode of his existence in language’,⁵⁵ it seems that we must assume a difference in the nature of what he calls ‘European existence’ and ‘East Asian existence’, ‘since the nature of language remains something altogether different for the Eastasian and the European peoples’. If language is the house of being, ‘then we Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house than Eastasian man’, he says in ‘A Dialogue on Language’.⁵⁶ Despite the fact that Heidegger talks, in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, about perished worlds, world-withdrawal and world-decay,⁵⁷ he assumes some continuity of existence, in some sense, between ancient Greece and modern Europe because of the linguistic family relation. (Why the Indic branch of the Indo-European family is excluded is not explained.) Further, this linguistic affinity supposedly ensures that we *can* return to the Greek origin and that we can, according to Heidegger, experience *aletheia* in the Greek sense,⁵⁸ or actually think ‘in Greek terms’.⁵⁹ It is this imaginary, purely cultural-linguistic continuity that, for Heidegger, unifies ‘the West’.

Everything suggests that for Heidegger the task of the overcoming of Western metaphysics is, for *essential* reasons, a ‘European’ task for ‘European’ peoples: a task which could only *be* a task for European existence and which only European existence could undertake, even after what he calls the Europeanization of the world.⁶⁰ To the extent that this argument is based on linguistic affinity, it turns out that for Heidegger ‘Europe’ means ‘Germany’. The Germans, Heidegger says in the interview with *Der Spiegel*, have a special role in the task because of

the inner relationship of the German language with the language of the Greeks and with their thought. This has been confirmed for me today again by the French. When they begin to think, they speak Ger-

man, being sure that they could not make it with their own language.⁶¹

Heidegger stuck to this view for more than 35 years. In *The Essence of Human Freedom* (a lecture course from 1930) he says that the extent to which all genuine languages are philosophical like the Greek ('it philosophizes in its basic structure and formation') 'depends on the depth and power of the people who speak the language and exist within it. Only our German language has a deep and creative philosophical character to compare with the Greek.'⁶² In this bizarre, arbitrary linguistic nationalism it is impossible not to see a relationship between Heidegger's conception of Western philosophy and his politics. If the comparative literature on Heidegger tends to leave this out of account, preferring instead an abstract conception of 'Heidegger's thought' detached not just from its historical and political context but from its own (even its own-most) being-historical and being-political, its concomitant silence on the fascist reception of Heidegger in Japan becomes comprehensible. The two are, simply, too closely connected. The idealist ground of the comparison facilitates this silence: the ideas in two sets of texts are interpreted and compared without consideration of their historical situations and meanings. This is more obvious with the first type of comparative claim about congruencies,⁶³ but it applies equally to the stronger claims about the East Asian influences on Heidegger, in so far as they neglect Heidegger's historico-political situation. Radically dehistoricized, uprooting thought from the factic basis on which Heidegger himself insisted, these comparisons are alien to any sense of the necessity of social-cultural or political context in the understanding of any given philosophical position or project. This is not to say, of course, that resonances cannot still be found, especially if one is looking for them. The idealism of comparative philosophy does not refute its own findings; on the contrary, it is one of its conditions of possibility.

The choice of Greece

None of this necessarily constitutes a refutation of any of the specific claims of influence in the comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought. But in failing to address the extent to which Heidegger locates the problem and the task of philosophy, and the form of existence adequate to it, in a radically reduced German nationalist idea of Europe, the comparative literature overlooks what is actually foundational to its own project: the construction of a history of Western philosophy in a determining *opposition* to the East. Heidegger was not the first to imagine ancient Greece

as the birthplace of Western philosophy, but his work – especially as mediated by Levinas and Derrida – is largely responsible for the status that this idea continues to enjoy in continental philosophy. To the extent that the self-conception of continental philosophy as an engaged relation with the history of philosophy presumes just *this* history of philosophy – so often presumes, as one may read over and over, that philosophy *is* Greek⁶⁴ – the very idea of continental philosophy appears to be mortgaged to it. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, it was presumed in Europe that the wisdom of the Greeks was derived from *non-European* sources, specifically (but not exclusively) Egypt, Persia and India. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, this was supplanted by the completely different – and now hegemonic – story of the exclusively Greek origin of what began to be called 'Western philosophy'. As Robert Bernasconi points out, the narrowing of the history of philosophy to its origins in Greece needs to be understood in relation to a certain narrowing of the conception of philosophy itself, making it possible for us to speak now of the exclusion of certain traditions of thought, including the Chinese, from the Western conception of philosophy.⁶⁵ (On this much, at least, the continental and the Anglo-American analytic philosophical traditions of the twentieth century have been in agreement.) Only after this exclusion can comparisons be made, because only after this exclusion are there two distinct traditions to be compared.

Despite the best intentions of the comparative literature on Heidegger, it cannot avoid a paradoxical collusion with this kind of history of Western philosophy, a history which has, indeed, been the condition of possibility for the field of East–West comparative studies in philosophy. 'Western philosophy' and 'Asian thought' (the latter internally subdivided into the imaginary unities of East Asian and Indian thought) are themselves 'Western' categories. The categories both provide the conceptual ground for comparative studies, as that which is to be compared, and throw the ground of that comparison into doubt in so far as they are internal to the Western problematic, just as the categories metaphysical/non-metaphysical are internal to the Western problematic. The obvious deconstructive fillip – the 'East' is, of course, therefore internal to the definition of the 'West' – does not refute, but rather confirms this, rendering the critical investigation of the categories all the more compelling.

The problems with the East–West comparative model are quite general, but, as I have argued, the use of the model in relation to Heidegger's work poses its own unique difficulty. For Heidegger the question of the Greek 'origin' of philosophy and of Western

civilization was *not* a question of any historiographic or factual beginning; it was, quite emphatically, *not* an empirical question. The positing of the Greek origin constituted, for Heidegger, the resolute repetition of a tradition, a resolute philosophical choice that not only sanctioned but also necessitated a disregard for the historical ‘facts’ about the empirical origins of philosophy.⁶⁶ But it is precisely this conception of the origin as resolute repetition that stymies the comparative project of the literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought, at least in so far as it claims to be Heideggerian. In Heidegger’s resolute repetition of the Western tradition a choice has been made – the choice of Greece, the choice of the West, the choice of Europe and the choice of Germany. This is, moreover, a necessary choice for Heidegger (‘it is my conviction that a reversal can only be prepared in the same place...’) and it is a choice that excludes ‘the East’, constitutively. Once again, this does not refute the claim that Heidegger was influenced by Daoist texts, but it does suggest that the comparative literature ought to include a critical reflection on Heidegger’s political-philosophical position on ‘the West’, which is in so many ways anathema to the ideological presuppositions of the comparative project.

Though Heidegger was obviously gratified by the interest in his work in East Asia, one consequence of his relation to the ‘original’ texts of his own tradition was his apparent belief that East Asians should go back to the ‘original’ texts of theirs.⁶⁷ In so far as the comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought constitutes such a ‘going back’ the mediating third term in the comparison – something beyond Western metaphysics – is also inflected in it as this idea of ‘going back’ (inseparable, in this context, from the idea of ‘ancientness’). This both rules out the possibility of a comparison with *modern* East Asian philosophy and sails dangerously close to that orientalism for which ‘the East’ signified the ancient in distinction from the modernity of ‘the West’.⁶⁸ Furthermore, on the back of Heidegger’s return to ancient sources, it seems to enable the metonymic construction of Heidegger as *himself* a timeless source, thus, once again, avoiding the historically and culturally located specificity of his philosophical-political position, and sidestepping the necessity for critique.

Notes

1. See Graham Parkes, ‘Rising Sun over Black Forest: Heidegger’s Japanese Connections’, in Reinhard May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work*, trans. Graham Parkes, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp. 82, 93.
2. See Graham Parkes, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*, p. ix.

3. On Tanabe see Naoki Sakai, ‘Ethnicity and Species: On the Philosophy of the Multi-ethnic State in Japanese Imperialism’, *Radical Philosophy* 95, May/June 1999; reprinted in Peter Osborne and Stella Sandford, eds, *Philosophies of Race and Ethnicity*, Continuum, London, 2002. On Miki see Harry Harootunian, *Overcome By Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2000, pp. 358–414.
4. May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*, p. 24.
5. See Graham Parkes, ‘Introduction’, in G. Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1990, p. 4.
6. Joan Stambaugh, ‘Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics’, in Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, p. 89.
7. Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’, trans. David Farrell Krell, in *Basic Writings*, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 98, 108.
8. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Volume IV, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, HarperCollins, New York, 1982, p. 201.
9. See May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*, p. 27; Parkes, ‘Introduction’, *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, p. 4.
10. May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*, p. 38; Charles Wei-Hsun Fu, ‘Creative Hermeneutics: Taoist Metaphysics and Heidegger’, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 3, 1976, p. 136.
11. See, for example, Elisabeth Feist Hirsch, ‘Martin Heidegger and the East’, *Philosophy East and West* 20, 1970, p. 254.
12. See, for example, Parkes, ‘Rising Sun over Black Forest’, pp. 81–7.
13. See, for example, Tetsuaki Kotoh, ‘Language and Silence: Self-Inquiry in Heidegger and Zen’, in Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought*.
14. Martin Buber, *Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse*, Leipzig, 1910. See Parkes, ‘Thoughts on the Way: *Being and Time* via Lao-Chuang’, in Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, p. 138, n. 4; May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*, p. 43.
15. May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*, p. 4.
16. Feist Hirsch, ‘Martin Heidegger and the East’, p. 247.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
18. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, Volume II: History of Scientific Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969, pp. 37–8.
19. Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India – China – Tibet – Japan*, revised edition by Philip P. Weiner, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1964, pp. 186, 187, 532, 533–5. The editor’s Preface (p. xi) quotes ‘renowned sinologue’ Professor P. Demiéville on Nakamura’s work: ‘I was particularly struck by the part on Japan which occupies nearly half of the work, for it constitutes a national self-criticism, wholesome and sharp, such as you would not have thought written by a Japanese.’ Demiéville is clearly pleased – if a little taken aback – at Nakamura’s mastery of the ideology and vocabulary of the sinology and Japanology of the period.
20. Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, Volume II, p. 199.
21. Parkes, ‘Thoughts on the Way’, p. 107. See also Stambaugh, ‘Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics’, in Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, p. 88.
22. May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*, p. 56.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 51.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 56. The quotation from Heidegger can be found

- (in a slightly different translation) in *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwell, Oxford, 1962, p. 272; *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1993, p. 229.
26. Martin Heidegger, 'Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache – Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden', *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Pfullingen, 1959; 'A Dialogue on Language: Between a Japanese and an Inquirer', trans. Peter D. Hertz, in *On the Way to Language*, Harper & Row, New York, 1982, p. 199. Tezuka's own account of his meeting with Heidegger, 'An Hour with Heidegger', in May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources*, confirms the fictional status of the dialogue.
 27. David E. Mungello, 'Malebranche and Chinese Philosophy', in Julia Ching and Willard G. Oxtoby, eds, *Discovering China: European Interpretations in the Enlightenment*, University of Rochester Press, Rochester NY, 1992, p. 67.
 28. See, for example, Heidegger, 'A Dialogue on Language', pp. 3–5.
 29. Michael Heim, 'A Philosophy of Comparison: Heidegger and Lao Tzu', *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 11, 1984, pp. 307, 309, 310, 316, 319.
 30. Heidegger, 'A Dialogue on Language', p. 19.
 31. Concerning the line (crossing Being) see Martin Heidegger, 'On the Question of Being', trans. William McNeill, in Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. Heidegger uses *Seyn* in his *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1989. The English translation by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (*Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1999) translates *Seyn* as 'be-ing'.
 32. See Otto Pöggeler, 'West–East Dialogue: Heidegger and Lao-tzu', in Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, pp. 58–9. Parkes acknowledges the problem in a general way in 'Afterwords – Language', in Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, especially pp. 215–16.
 33. See, for example, Robert E. Allison (ed.), *Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and Hong Kong, 1989.
 34. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII 1028a, trans. Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1933, p. 311.
 35. A.C. Graham, "'Being" in Western Philosophy Compared with *Shih/Fei* and *Yu/Wu* in Chinese Philosophy', *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, State University of New York Press, Albany NY, 1990, p. 323.
 36. A.C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Arguments in Ancient China*, Open Court, LaSalle IL, 1989, Appendix 2, 'The Relation of Chinese Thought to the Chinese Language', p. 413; see also p. 414. For a critique of Graham's general approach to this question, see Robert Wardy, *Aristotle in China: Language, Categories and Translation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 3. In *Translation and Subjectivity* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1997, p. 86) Naoki Sakai discusses Watsuji Tetsuro's treatment of the same issue in Japanese: Watsuji 'points out the difference between the term *sonzai* (being), an equivalent of *ningen*, and German *Sein*, so as to exemplify the grammatical limitation of European languages that Western ontology has taken for granted.'
 37. A.C. Graham, 'Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese', *Unreason Within Reason: Essays on the Outskirts of Rationality*, Open Court, LaSalle IL, 1992, p. 78.
 38. 'In symbolic logic the verb "to be" dissolves into the sign of existence (\exists), which is not a predicate but a quantifier, and three separate copulae, the signs of identity ($=$), class membership (\in) and class inclusion (\subset).' Graham, 'Being in Linguistics and Philosophy', in *Unreason Within Reason*, p. 93.
 39. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, p. 408. In this book Graham addresses the issue of the allegedly unphilosophical nature of Chinese philosophy directly. On 'Being' in Indo-European languages and philosophy, see also 'Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese', p. 87.
 40. May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources*, p. 26.
 41. Feist Hirsch, 'Martin Heidegger and the East', p. 250.
 42. May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources*, p. xviii.
 43. To be found, according to Parkes (in May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources*, n. a, p. 65) in Heidegger's 'Winke', *Gesamtausgabe*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, Volume 13, p. 33.
 44. May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources*, p. 53. See also Parkes, 'Introduction', in Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, p. 7.
 45. May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources*, p. 45. May's chapter 5 is titled 'A Kind of Confession'.
 46. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
 47. Parkes, 'Translator's Preface', in May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources*, pp. viii, x.
 48. Cited by Parkes, *ibid.*, p. x.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. ix.
 50. "'Only a God Can Save Us'", trans. Maria P. Alter and John D. Caputo, in Richard Wolin, ed., *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1993, p. 113, my emphasis. See also Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1987, especially pp. 37–9.
 51. May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources*, p. 53. Parkes quotes from the letter in 'Rising Sun over Black Forest', in *ibid.*, pp. 101–2.
 52. Robert Bernasconi, 'Will the Real Kant Please Stand Up: The Challenge of Enlightenment Racism to the Study of the History of Philosophy', *Radical Philosophy* 117, January/February 2003. See also Joseph McCarney, 'Hegel's Racism? A Response to Bernasconi', and Bernasconi, 'Hegel's Racism: A Reply to McCarney', both in *Radical Philosophy* 119, May/June 2003.
 53. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth*, trans. Ted Sadler, Continuum, London, 2002, pp. 87–8.
 54. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Ted Sadler, Continuum, London, 2002, p. 52.
 55. Martin Heidegger, 'The Nature of Language', in *On the Way to Language*, p. 57.
 56. Heidegger, 'A Dialogue on Language', pp. 3, 23, 5.
 57. Martin Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', trans. Albert Hofstadter, in Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 166.
 58. Martin Heidegger, 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking', trans. Joan Stambaugh, in Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 448.
 59. Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, p. 58.
 60. See, for example, 'A Dialogue on Language', p. 15; 'On Time and Being', p. 59.
 61. Heidegger, "'Only a God Can Save Us'", p. 113. See also Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 57.
 62. *Ibid.*; Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, pp. 35–6.
 63. See, for example, Stambaugh, 'Heidegger, Taoism,

and the Question of Metaphysics', p. 90: 'the *tao* has been described ... as "the rhythm of the space-time structure," as "an uncircumscribed power ruling the totality of perceptible givens, itself remaining accessible to any specific actualization." This is not exactly Heidegger's language, but surely the true spirit of his thought.' Stambaugh is quoting from Marcel Granet, *La Pensée chinoise*, La Renaissance du Livre, Paris, 1934. Similarly, Feist Hirsch: 'Although there are wide areas of disagreement between Samkara [a Hindu philosopher of the eighth and ninth centuries, Christian calendar], it is surprising to note that they share some basic thoughts' ('Martin Heidegger and the East', p. 256).

64. Despite a critique of ethnocentrism, this conception of 'Western metaphysics' and its basis in 'Greek conceptuality' is particularly marked in Jacques Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1997; it is also fundamental to Emmanuel Levinas's *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1969.
65. Robert Bernasconi, 'Philosophy's Paradoxical Parochialism', in Keith Ansell Pearson, Benita Parry and Judith Squires, eds, *Cultural Readings of Imperialism: Edward Said and the Gravity of History*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1997, especially p. 221.
66. On tradition and repetition see, for example, *Being and*

Time, §74, pp. 434–439; Robert Bernasconi, 'Heidegger and the Invention of the Western Philosophical Tradition', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 26, no. 3, October 1995; Robert Bernasconi, 'On Heidegger's Other Sins of Omission: His Exclusion of Asian Thought from the Origins of Occidental Metaphysics and His Denial of the Possibility of Christian Philosophy', *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 69, no. 2; Stella Sandford, 'How the West Was One: Heidegger and the Greek Origin of Continental Philosophy', in John Sellars, ed., *Ancient and Continental Philosophy*, forthcoming.

67. See, for example, 'A Dialogue on Language', p. 37, in which the 'Japanese' says: 'Professor Tanabe often came back to a question you once put to him: why it was that we Japanese did not call back to mind the venerable beginnings of our own thinking, instead of chasing ever more greedily after the latest news in European philosophy.'
68. See Harry Harootunian, *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p. 41. Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, eds, *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, is part of the effort to address Western ignorance of contemporary Chinese philosophy.